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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 
 
 Jurisdiction rests with this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 78-2a-
3(2)(j). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
 Issue 1:  The trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of 
substantial partial performance and in only applying the statute of frauds 
analysis.   
 Standard of Review:  De novo. “Questions of statutory interpretation 
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed ‘for correctness’ giving no 
deference to the [trial] court’s interpretation.”  Centennial Inv. Co., LLC, v. 
Nuttall, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted).   A review of 
summary proceedings under Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-7 calls for statutory 
interpretation and presents a question of law; there is no deference given to 
the trial court’s legal conclusion.    Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244, 1246 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
 
 Preservation for Appeal:  Record at pages 50-54. 
 
 Issue 2:  The trial court erred in failing to deem the statute of frauds 
was satisfied where grantor admits that agent has authority to act on his behalf 
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and agent signs document conveying interest in real property.    
 Standard of Review:  De novo. “Questions of statutory interpretation 
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed ‘for correctness’ giving no 
deference to the [trial] court’s interpretation.”  Centennial Investment 
Company, LLC, v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App. 321, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 
2007) (citations omitted).   A review of summary proceedings under Utah 
Code Ann., § 38-9-7 calls for statutory interpretation and presents a question 
of law; there is no deference given to the trial court’s legal conclusion.    
Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
 
 Preservation for Appeal:  Record at pages 50-54. 
 
 Issue 3:  The District Court erred in dismissing Frank Fu’s counter-
claim and cross-claim at the conclusion of the of the wrongful lien hearing, 
i.e. does a counter-claim survive the final order where the initial lawsuit is for 
a wrongful lien? 
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 Standard of Review:  De novo. “Questions of statutory interpretation 
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed ‘for correctness’ giving no 
deference to the [trial] court’s interpretation.”  Centennial Investment 
Company, LLC, v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App. 321, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 
2007).  A review of summary proceedings under Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-7 
calls for statutory interpretation and presents a question of law; there is no 
deference given to the trial court’s legal conclusion.    Russell v. Thomas, 999 
P.2d 1244, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
 
 Preservation for Appeal:  Frank Fu argued that the counter-claims and 
cross-claims should not be dismissed.   
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS OR RULES 
  
 Constitution Provisions:  The due process clause at Art. I, § 7 of the 
Utah Constitution which states “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” 
 
Statutory Provisions:   
1)  Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-1, et seq. Wrongful Liens and Wrongful 
Judgment Liens.  See Addendum “A” at the end of brief.   
2) Utah Code Ann., § 57-9-1.  See Addendum “B” at the end of brief.   
3) Utah Code Ann., § 25-5-1.  See Addendum “C” at the end of brief. 
 
 Rules:   
 Rule 13(b) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure:  “A pleading may state 
as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of 
the transaction of occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing 
party’s claim.” 
  6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case & Procedural History 
 The issue in this case is whether Frank Fu’s notice of interest on Tolin 
is proper or wrongful.  Joseph Naso and Rene (Naso) Evans filed a complaint 
against Frank Fu on April 1, 2008, alleging that his notice of interest filed on 
two pieces of real property, Brandonwood and Tolin, constituted a wrongful 
lien.  Frank Fu filed counter-claims and third-party claims alleging breach of 
contract, foreclosure, fraudulent transfer, common law fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation.  These claims were filed because Frank Fu believes that 
Clyde Rhodes and Joseph Naso, among others, conspired together to cheat 
him out of the $105,000.00 he paid for an interest in real property in this case, 
plus other money he loaned totaling about $50,000.00.    
 Judge Deno Himonas started an expedited hearing on Joseph Naso and 
Rene (Naso) Evans’ wrongful lien claim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 39-9-
7, late in the afternoon on June 15th and finished it on the 16th.   
 At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Himonas ruled that Frank Fu’s 
notice of interest on Brandonwood was proper but as to Tolin it was wrongful.  
Judge Himonas reasoned that while Rene (Naso) Evans had signed a warranty 
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deed conveying her interest in Tolin, Joseph Naso had not signed the warranty 
deed or any document conveying his interest and thus the applicable statute of 
frauds was not satisfied.  Judge Himonas ruled as he did even though Frank 
Fu paid $105,000.000 which was supposed to include an interest in both 
Brandonwood and Tolin.   
 The Order finding the wrongful lien was signed by Judge Deno 
Himonas on May 12, 2008.  Judge Himonas also dismissed Frank Fu’s 
counter-claims and third-party claim.  Frank Fu appeals those decisions.  
 
Statement of Facts 
 The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are as follows:  Joseph and 
Rene Evans (Naso) knew that an interest in two pieces of property, 
Brandonwood and Tolin, were being offered by Clyde Rhodes to Frank Fu.  
(See R. at page 51-52.)  There is no issue as to whether Rene Naso transferred 
her interest to Frank Fu through her agent Clyde Rhodes, see R. at p. 59:25, 
and 60:1-14, the only issue is whether Joseph Naso did because he did not 
sign the warranty deed.  
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 Joseph Naso testified under oath that he “knew [Clyde Rhodes] was 
acting for us,” see R. at pp. 55:25 and 56:1-4, i.e. on behalf of Joseph and 
Rene Naso.  Joseph Naso also testified that he intended Tolin to be part of a 
buyout that was being brokered by Clyde Rhodes, see Court Transcript at 
55:25 and 56:1-2, and knew that Frank Fu was relying on Tolin being part of 
the buyout.  (See Court Transcript at pp. 55:4-9, 53, 52, 52:10-16 and R. at p. 
74-75, 66, 51:7-8, 52:8-9.)  And, as part of that buyout, Frank Fu paid the sum 
of $105,000.00 to Clyde Rhodes, via his dba L2O Homes, LLC and PGI 
Management, Inc., and Frank Fu was supposed to receive an interest in both 
Brandonwood and Tolin. See R. at pp 51-52, 77, and 84.  Because Clyde 
Rhodes, Joseph Naso and Rene Evans refused to acknowledge Frank Fu’s 
interest in Tolin he filed a notice of interest on the same.   
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 In this case, Joseph Naso intended to convey his interest in real property 
to Frank Fu through his agent Clyde Rhodes.  His agent Clyde Rhodes signed 
a document conveying that interest and Frank Fu paid $105,000.00 for the 
  9
interest. The only missing piece  in the case is a document Joseph Naso signed 
giving his agent authority to convey his interest in the property.  However this 
missing piece should be deemed satisfied since Joseph Naso testified under 
oath that Clyde Rhodes is his agent, he intended to convey his interest in Tolin 
to Frank Fu and new that Frank Fu was relying on Tolin being part of the deal.   
 The facts of this case satisfy the doctrine of substantial performance and 
should also be deemed to have complied with the statute of frauds.   
 
ARGUMENT 
 
The trial court’s decision that Frank Fu’s notice of interest on Tolin is a 
wrongful lien is not correct.  The actions by the parties in this case satisfy the 
doctrine of “sufficient partial performance” or the requisite statute of frauds 
and therefore Frank Fu obtained an interest in Tolin.  The trial court did not 
consider the doctrine of sufficient partial performance and should have.  And, 
under the principles of general agency law the statute of frauds should also be 
deemed to be met.  Additionally, the trial court’s dismissal of Frank Fu’s 
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counter-claims and third-party claims is in error, as such claims are 
specifically allowed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 13(b) even in a wrongful lien 
action.    
 
I. JOSEPH NASO’S INTEREST IN TOLIN WAS 
TRANSFERRED TO FRANK FU UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF “SUFFICIENT 
PARTIAL PERFORMANCE.”  
 
 In Utah an interest in real property may be transferred orally outside the 
statute of frauds under the equitable doctrine of “sufficient partial 
performance.”  The Utah Supreme Court set forth the elements for Sufficient 
Partial Performance in Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002), as 
follows:   
[1] the oral contract must be clear and definite; [2] 
the acts done in performance of the contract must 
be equally clear and definite; and [3] the act must 
be in reliance on the contract.  Such acts in 
reliance must be such that they would not have 
been performed had the contract not existed, and 
(b) the failure to perform on the part of the 
promisor would result in fraud on the performer 
who relied since damages would be inadequate.  
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The word “oral” also includes acts.  Id.  
This case meets every required element for Sufficient Partial 
Performance set forth in Warr and the trial court should have found the 
transfer of property valid.  
 
A. The terms of the oral contract are clear.  
The terms of the contract between Frank Fu and Joseph Naso are clear 
and are as follows:  Frank Fu was to pay the sum of $105,000.00 to Clyde 
Rhodes, the actual and apparent agent1 of Joseph Naso and in exchange Frank 
Fu was to receive an interest in property including Tolin.  There can be no 
reasonable dispute that these are the terms and information set forth below 
establishes the same.   
After various negotiations, Clyde Rhodes sent an email to Frank Fu on 
July 18, 2007, which contained the Tolin property and stated that “Joey and 
                                            
1 It cannot be reasonably disputed that Clyde Rhodes is the agent of Joseph 
Naso in this transaction.  Joseph Naso admitted that Clyde Rhodes had 
authority to offer Tolin in the package deal and intended that it be offered.   
See Court Transcript at pp. 50-53 and R. at pp. 66, 74-75.  And Joseph Naso 
testified that “I knew he was acting for us . . . .”  See Court Transcript at pp. 
55:25 and 56:1-4.    
  12
Rene are committed. No turning back” and that he needed “$110,000.002 
before Monday evening” because Joey Naso is going out of town. R. at p. 74-
75. 
At the hearing it was pointed out to Mr. Naso that the email stated 
“Joey and Rene are committed, no turning back,” see Court Transcript at p. 
55:4, Joseph responded with “Yes, that sounds right.”  See Court Transcript at 
p. 55:6.  And again he was asked, “so you were committed and there was no 
turning back?” he responded with “Yes.”  See Court Transcript at p. 55:6-9.     
Frank Fu was also given a spreadsheet from Clyde Rhodes that was 
captioned “FRANK FU – BUY-OUT – JOEY NASO AND RENE EVANS” 
and this spreadsheet included the Tolin property.  See R. at p. 66.  Joseph 
Naso admits that he saw this spreadsheet but would not confirm when he saw 
it.  See R. at p. 66. 
Joseph Naso also testified at the hearing when referring to the deal “At 
one point I told Clyde, sounds good, sounds okay . . . .”3  And when Joseph 
                                            
2 There is no dispute that the amount was later reduced to $105,000.00 as this 
is the most money the bank would loan Frank Fu at the time.   
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Naso was asked “Did you know that Tolin Street was part of a potential 
buyout?” by Frank Fu he answered “I did.  I knew it was part of it.”  See R. at 
p 51:7-8.  Under additional questioning Mr. Naso was asked if he “knew that 
Tolin Street was part of the buyout . . .”  he responded “Yes, I did.”  See R. at 
p 52:8-9. 
He was also asked “Did you know that Mr. Fu was relying on Tolin 
Street being part of the deal?” and he answered “Yes, I knew that, Yes, I knew 
that.”  See Court Transcript at p. 53.  And when Joseph Naso was asked “ . . . 
you did intend Tolin Street – you knew Tolin Street was going to be part of 
the deal?”  he responded “Yes.”  See  Court Transcript at p. 52.)   And again 
when asked if he “intended it to be part of the deal?”  he responded “That’s 
correct.”  Id.   
                                                                                                                                     
3 Joseph qualifies this statement by adding that when he got the paperwork he 
did not sign it claiming he got “cold feet.”  See Court Transcript p. 54:22-25 
and p. 55:1-4.  However, there is no indication ever that this message was 
conveyed to Frank Fu who actually paid the money.  
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Additionally, it is clear that the purchase price Mr. Fu was to pay for the 
interest in Tolin, and other property, was $105,000.004.  See Court Transcript 
at p. 52:10-16.  
Based on the foregoing it is clear that Joseph Naso intended to sell his 
interest in Tolin to Frank Fu, that Clyde Rhodes had authority to broker the 
deal, that Joseph Naso intended it to be part of the deal, and knew full well 
that Frank Fu was relying on it to be part of the deal.  And finally, that the 
price that was to be paid for an interest in Tolin and other property was 
$105,000.00 and that the sum was to be paid to Clyde Rhodes.  See Record at 
p. 52:11-12.   
 
 
 
B. The acts done in performance are also clear and definite.   
                                            
4 Mr. Naso testified that of the $105,000.00 paid to Clyde Rhodes, he and 
Rene were to get $60,000.00 which they would then split.  See Record at p. 
52:11-12.   
  15
The next question is what was done in performance that was also clear 
and definite.  All of the points set forth in section “A.” immediately above 
apply, i.e. the emails, the spread-sheets, the expectations and reliance by the 
parties and based on the communications, the spreadsheets, the expectations 
and reliance on these and other representations, Frank Fu obtained a loan from 
Washington Mutual Bank for $105,000.00.  See R. at p. 72.  Further, Clyde 
Rhodes signed a Promissory Note for the $105,000.00, the amount Frank Fu 
paid and the Note had as its security an interest in all of the assets of L2O5 
which includes Tolin. See R. at pp. 72 and 84.  And, Frank Fu paid the 
$105,000.00 to Clyde Rhodes.  While Joseph Naso testified that he never 
received the $60,000.00 of the $105,000.00 that he was supposed to receive 
from Clyde Rhodes, this was never contemplated to be part of the contract and 
no one has ever asserted that it was; that agreement was strictly between 
                                            
5  Clyde Rhodes conducted this transaction through a couple different names, 
PGI Management, Inc. and L2O Homes, LLC.  L2O Homes, LLC was never 
created, see R. at p. 14:6-8, and therefore the check for the $105,000.00 was 
paid to PGI, Inc.  See R. Court Transcript at p.72. Additionally Frank Fu was 
to be 50% owner in L2O Homes, LLC and is at least a partner with Clyde 
Rhodes for purposes of receiving an interest in Tolin.  A recent review of the 
Department of Corporations reveals that PGI, Inc. may not have been formally 
created either.      
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Joseph Naso and his agent Clyde Rhodes.  See Court Transcript 52:8-19.  The 
facts remains that the price for an interest in the package of property which 
included Tolin was $105,000.00 and the same was to be paid to Clyde Rhodes 
aka PGI Management, Inc., and it was in fact paid.  See Court Transcript p. 
52:11-16 and R. at p. 66, 74-75, 77, 72.     
  
C. Frank Fu would not have paid the $105,000.00 if there 
was no contract and the failure to perform on the part 
of Joseph Naso results in fraud on Frank Fu. 
  
The only reason that Frank Fu paid the $105,000.00 was for an interest 
in real property which included Tolin and Frank Fu has never been refunded 
any of the money he paid.  As set forth above, Joseph Naso intended Tolin to 
be part of the contract, knew it was part of the contract, and knew that Frank 
Fu was relying on it being part of the contract.  Unless this court deems Frank 
Fu’s notice of interest is valid and the trial court’s decision is reversed, a fraud 
will result on Frank Fu who relied upon the actions and inactions of Joseph 
Naso and the representations and actions of his agent Clyde Rhodes.   
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 D. Summary of Substantial Partial Performance. 
The trial court did not consider substantial partial performance when 
analyzing Frank Fu’s Notice of Interest.  It relied merely on the fact that 
Joseph Naso did not sign the warranty deed transferring his interest.  Frank Fu 
argued that the Joseph Naso should be estopped in claiming it did not transfer 
his interest, see Court Transcript at p. 61, he also argued that the court would 
be sanctioning a fraud, see Court Transcript at pp. 43:25 and 44:1-10, if it 
failed to find his Notice of Interest was valid.  All of the elements of the 
elements of substantial partial performance are met and this matter should be 
remanded to the trial court so that the trial court’s decision can be corrected.  
II. ALTERNATIVELY, FRANK FU’S NOTICE 
OF INTEREST IS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN 
BECAUSE HE HAD AN ARGUABLE BASIS 
FOR FILING THE SAME AND HIS 
ARGUMENTS ARE SUPPORTED BY 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. 
 
 Alternatively, Frank Fu’s notice of interest is a lien allowed by statute 
and not in violation of wrongful lien act.  A lien is not wrongful if at the time 
it is recorded it is expressly authorized by statute.  See Utah Code Ann., § 38-
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9-1(6)(a).  The Marketable Record Title Act at Utah Code Ann., § 57-9-1 
states: 
 Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep 
effective such interest by filing for recording during the forty-
year period immediately rolling the effective date of the root 
title of the person whose record title would otherwise be 
marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, setting 
forth the nature of the claim. 
 
In this case, Frank Fu obtained an interest in Tolin under the doctrine of 
substantial partial performance as argued above.  Being thus qualified, Frank 
Fu is permitted to file his notice of interest pursuant to the Marketable Record 
Title Act which exempts it as a wrongful lien.  See Utah Code Ann., 38-9-
1(6)(a). The trial court erred when it failed to recognize Frank Fu’s interest as 
a statutorily lawful claim.  
Joseph Naso may argue that Frank Fu did not have an interest in Tolin 
because while Rene Evans (Naso) had signed the warranty deed, Joseph Naso 
did not and this exact scenario was already litigated and decided in Centennial 
Inv. Co., LLC v. Nuttal, 171 P.3d 458, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).  If the facts 
stopped there, they would be correct; however, the facts do not stop there.  
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This case is different from Centennial in that equitable doctrines set forth 
above give Frank Fu an interest in Tolin.   Joseph Naso’s nefarious use of the 
law to perpetrate the fraud should not be condoned.   
 
III. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD BE 
DEEMED TO BE SATISFIED WHERE A 
PARTY ADMITS UNDER OATH THAT 
THEIR AGENT HAD AUTHORITY TO 
CONVEY LAND AND THE AGENT SIGNED 
A WRITING CONVEYING AN INTEREST IN 
LAND.  
 
Frank Fu believes that the arguments above are sufficient to prove his 
notice of interest is valid and that it is not a wrongful lien. However, Frank Fu 
also offers this additional argument to prove his case. 
With very few exceptions, the transfer of real property is governed by 
Utah Code Ann., § 25-5-1 which states in pertinent part as follows:  
“[n]o estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized by writing.”   
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 In this case, the statute of frauds should be deemed to have been 
satisfied, by “operation of law,” id., because Clyde Rhodes, acting as Joseph 
Naso’s agent, offered Tolin for sale to Frank Fu, Frank Fu accepted the offer 
and paid $105,000.00 for an interest in Tolin and Clyde Rhodes signed a 
document transferring the interest.  The only missing element is the signed 
writing between Joseph Naso and Clyde Rhodes giving Clyde Rhodes the 
authority to convey the interest in Tolin.  However, this element should be 
deemed satisfied because in this case, Joseph Naso testified that Clyde Rhodes 
had the authority and this should supplant or satisfy the writing element, i.e. 
Joseph Naso should be estopped from claiming that Clyde Rhodes signature is 
his signature.  
 The problem with summary proceedings such as one conducted under 
Utah Code Ann., 38-9-7(3)(b) is that the non-moving party has no time to 
conduct discovery.  In a case like this, discovery is crucial.  Joseph Naso 
admitted under oath that he intended to sell his interest in Tolin and knew that 
his agent was trying to do so and there was apparent express and apparent 
authority for his agent to sell Tolin.  Additionally, there was a signed writing 
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by the agent selling or assigning the interest to Frank Fu.  See R. at pp. 74-75, 
77 and 84. With discovery, Frank Fu, with an almost certainty, would have 
discovered a signed writing to satisfy the statute of frauds requirement. Given 
Frank Fu’s counter-claims and cross claims, see R. at pp. 18-33, the court 
should have at a minimum allowed the case to proceed and should not have 
decided the case under the summary proceedings so that Frank Fu could have 
conducted discovery.   
While the summary proceeding section provides a great protection to 
shield those that have been the victim of a wrongful lien, it should not be used 
as a sword to create another victim that is entitled to a lien.  The summary 
proceeding in this case has denied Frank Fu of his due process rights provided 
for by the Utah Constitution at Art. I., § 7.  In this case there is almost no 
doubt if Frank Fu was allowed to conduct discovery he would have been able 
to marshal evidence to support his claim.   
In a case such as this case, where the weight of evidence suggests that 
the non-moving party will likely prevail in the normal course of litigation, a 
summary proceeding effectively denies Mr. Fu of his right to due process.  
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 This matter should be remanded to the trial court with the instruction 
that the matter proceed under the normal course of litigation so that discovery 
may be conducted.  
CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded to the trial court so that it can consider 
the doctrine of substantial performance or find that the statute of frauds has 
been met or to allow for additional discovery to be completed.  
 
DATED this             day of October 2008. 
    __________________________ 
      Bradley G. Nykamp 
      Attorney for Appellant Frank Fu 
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